Convening Authority: Who Sends a Case to Court-Martial, and Who No Longer Can
On this page
- Who may convene, by the kind of court-martial
- What the convening authority does, and what it does not do
- The article that removed the decision: Article 24a
- Where the line falls: what a commander may still do
- Who a special trial counsel is, and who certifies them
- The dates that decide which regime applies
- One limit the Manual adds to the ones the Code states
- What this page does not decide
- Where to go from here
- Sources
For most of the Uniform Code’s life, one person decided whether a case went to trial: the commander with authority to convene a court-martial. That is no longer true for an entire class of offenses, and the change is written into the statute rather than into policy.
This page sets out who may convene each of the three kinds of court-martial, then sets out the article that took the referral decision away from those commanders for certain offenses and gave it to a lawyer outside their chain. The second half is the part a description written before 2023 gets wrong.
It does not tell you who holds authority over any particular case, or what any decision-maker will do with one.
Who may convene, by the kind of court-martial
The Code names conveners in three separate articles, and the lists run from the top down.
General courts-martial are the most serious forum, and Article 22 begins its list with the President:
“(a) General courts-martial may be convened by— (1) the President of the United States; (2) the Secretary of Defense;”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 822 (Article 22), subsection (a).
The list continues through service secretaries and named commanders. What matters for reading it is the structure: convening authority attaches to positions, not to ranks in general, and a commander either occupies a listed position or does not.
Article 23 then builds the special court-martial list on top of the general one, opening with “(1) any person who may convene a general court-martial” and adding further commanders below that. Article 24 does the same for summary courts-martial, opening with “(1) any person who may convene a general or special court-martial”.
The effect is a nested structure. Anyone who can convene the most serious forum can convene the less serious ones; the reverse does not hold.
What the convening authority does, and what it does not do
Two limits on the role are written into the statute and are worth separating from the general impression of command power.
Article 25(e)(2) requires the convening authority to detail as members those who are “best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament”, and then disqualifies some people outright:
“No member of an armed force is eligible to serve as a member of a general or special court-martial when the member is the accuser or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as preliminary hearing officer or as counsel in the same case.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 825 (Article 25), subsection (e)(2).
Article 37 addresses influence on the proceeding itself, and its existence tells you what the drafters were guarding against: the same command structure that convenes a court also writes the evaluations of the people sitting on it.
The article that removed the decision: Article 24a
Article 24a created a new office and gave it authority the commander used to hold. The grant is exclusive, and the statute says so in those words.
“(A) Authority.—A special trial counsel shall have exclusive authority to determine if a reported offense is a covered offense and shall exercise authority over any such offense in accordance with this chapter.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 824a (Article 24a), subsection (c)(2)(A).
Four powers follow, and each one is a power a convening authority previously exercised:
“(3) Dismissal; referral; plea bargains.—Subject to paragraph (5), with respect to charges and specifications alleging any offense over which a special trial counsel exercises authority, a special trial counsel shall have exclusive authority to, in accordance with this chapter— (A) on behalf of the Government, withdraw or dismiss the charges and specifications or make a motion to withdraw or dismiss the charges and specifications; (B) refer the charges and specifications for trial by a special or general court-martial; (C) enter into a plea agreement; and (D) determine if an authorized rehearing is impracticable.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 824a (Article 24a), subsection (c)(3).
And the decision binds:
“(4) Binding determination.—The determination of a special trial counsel to refer charges and specifications to a court-martial for trial shall be binding on any applicable convening authority for the referral of such charges and specifications.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 824a (Article 24a), subsection (c)(4).
Where the line falls: what a commander may still do
The transfer is not total, and subsection (c)(5) draws the boundary precisely. If a special trial counsel exercises authority over an offense and elects not to prefer or refer charges, a commander may exercise the commander’s own authorities “except that such commander or convening authority may not refer charges and specifications for a covered offense for trial by special or general court-martial.”
Read the exception. The commander gets the case back for other purposes but cannot send a covered offense to a special or general court-martial. Referral for covered offenses is gone from that office regardless of what the special trial counsel decides.
Who a special trial counsel is, and who certifies them
The office is filled by commissioned officers, and the qualification requirement was rewritten in December 2025. The current text routes it through a definition elsewhere in the Code:
“(A) is a judge advocate who is qualified under section 806(a)(1) of this title (article 6(a)(1)); and”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 824a (Article 24a), subsection (b)(1)(A), as amended by Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title V, §561(b)(2), Dec. 18, 2025.
That cross-reference is the whole change, and it is worth following. Article 6(a)(1) sets four conditions:
“(1) A member of the armed forces may only serve as a judge advocate if such member— (A) is admitted to the practice of law before the highest court of a State, territory, commonwealth, or the District of Columbia; (B) maintains a license status that provides current eligibility to actively practice law before such court; (C) is subject to the disciplinary review process of the jurisdiction in which such member maintains such a license status; and (D) is in compliance with any other requirements of such jurisdiction to remain eligible to practice law in such jurisdiction.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 806 (Article 6), subsection (a)(1), as amended by Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title V, §§561(a), 562, Dec. 18, 2025.
And the same amendment gave that standard teeth. Article 6(a)(2) adds an enforcement mechanism that did not exist before:
“(2) The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps may suspend the authority of a judge advocate of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marine Corps, respectively, to perform legal duties if such judge advocate becomes noncompliant with the requirements of paragraph (1). A member of the armed forces who is suspended or disbarred from the practice of law within a jurisdiction may not perform legal duties.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 806 (Article 6), subsection (a)(2), added by Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title V, §561(a), Dec. 18, 2025.
Two different rules are in that paragraph. The first is discretionary and internal: a Judge Advocate General “may suspend” the authority of a non-compliant judge advocate. The second is mandatory and external: a member suspended or disbarred by a licensing jurisdiction “may not perform legal duties”, and no service decision is required to make that so.
Read what moved. The earlier standard asked only for bar membership in a Federal court or a State’s highest court. The current standard asks for admission before a State, territory, commonwealth or District of Columbia high court, and a licence providing current eligibility to practise, and exposure to that jurisdiction’s discipline, and compliance with its other conditions. The earlier federal text did not expressly require current active-practice eligibility; the current one does. That is the defensible statement of the change. What the earlier standard permitted in practice depended on service regulation and certification practice that this page did not open, so no claim is made about it here.
A lead special trial counsel appointed under section 1044f(a)(2) must be “in a grade no lower than O-7.” Certification runs through the Judge Advocate General rather than through the operational chain, which is the same design choice that separates defense counsel from the command.
The dates that decide which regime applies
Article 24a(d) reaches backwards, and the first group is enumerated by article number:
“(A) An offense under section 917a (article 117a), 918 (article 118), section 919 (article 119), section 919a (article 119a), section 920 (article 120), section 920a (article 120a), section 920b (article 120b), section 920c (article 120c), section 928b (article 128b), or the standalone offense of child pornography punishable under section 934 (article 134) of this title that occurred on or before December 27, 2023.”
Source: 10 U.S.C. 824a (Article 24a), subsection (d)(1)(A), as amended by Pub. L. 118–159, div. A, title V, §562, Dec. 23, 2024.
That list grew on 23 December 2024, and the same Act restructured the subsection around it. Three things happened, all in Pub. L. 118–159 §562.
Articles 119a and 120a were inserted into the list in paragraph (1)(A), so a description of the reach-back written before that date is short by two offenses. The paragraph then continues with further listed offenses tied to other date windows, and with conspiracies, solicitations and attempts.
A new paragraph (2) was inserted, and its dates run in the direction people get backwards. The authority becomes exercisable after 1 January 2025, and it reaches the standalone offense of sexual harassment under Article 134 where the offense occurred “after January 26, 2022, and on or before January 1, 2025” and a formal complaint was substantiated under the Secretary’s regulations. So the offense sits in the past and the authority arrives later; the 2025 date is when the power switches on, not when the conduct happens.
The former paragraph (2) became paragraph (3). That is the provision quoted below, and a citation to Article 24a(d)(2) written before December 2024 now points at the sexual-harassment paragraph rather than at the covered-offense rule.
Where authority is exercised under paragraph (1) or (2), the statute provides that the offense “shall be considered a covered offense for purposes of this chapter.”
So a case’s date does not by itself put it outside the new regime. This is the single most useful thing to know about the reform: it has a reach-back, and the reach-back is enumerated.
One limit the Manual adds to the ones the Code states
Article 37 prohibits censuring a court-martial and deterring participation. A presidential order added a narrower and more specific prohibition to the Manual on 20 December 2024, and it is aimed at the office this page is about.
“(3) No superior convening authority or officer may direct a subordinate convening authority or officer to make a particular disposition in a specific case or otherwise substitute the discretion of such authority or such officer for that of the subordinate convening authority or officer.”
Source: Executive Order 14130, 20 December 2024, Annex, amending the Manual for Courts-Martial.
Read what it protects. Not the court, and not a witness, but the subordinate convening authority’s own discretion. The rule bars two distinct things: directing a particular disposition in a specific case, and substituting one officer’s discretion for another’s by any other route. The second clause is the one that closes the obvious workaround.
That matters for how the authority described on this page is structured. Convening authority is held by an office rather than by a chain, and a superior cannot exercise a subordinate’s share of it by instruction.
What this page does not decide
Which offenses are covered offenses. The term is defined elsewhere in the Code by reference to a list of articles, and whether a particular allegation falls inside it is a determination the statute assigns exclusively to a special trial counsel.
Whether any commander held or holds authority in a particular case. Convening authority attaches to positions, and which position a person occupies is a fact.
What any decision-maker will do. Referral is a discretionary decision, and this page describes who holds the discretion rather than predicting its exercise.
Where to go from here
The advice a commander receives before referral comes from the staff judge advocate, and the government’s case at trial is run by trial counsel, which is a different office again. How charges reach a convening authority in the first place is in preferral of charges, and the wider sequence is in what happens before a court-martial.
Sources
- 10 U.S.C. 822 · Article 22, Who may convene general courts-martial · the list for the most serious forum
- 10 U.S.C. 824a · Article 24a, Special trial counsel · exclusive authority, the four powers, the binding-referral rule, and the reach-back dates
- 10 U.S.C. 825 · Article 25, Who may serve on courts-martial · the detailing standard and the disqualifications
- 10 U.S.C. chapter 47 · the Code in full · Articles 23 and 24, and the amendment chains
What this page did not open. The service regulations promulgated under Article 24a(a) were not opened, and they govern how special trial counsel are detailed within each service. No court decision was opened.
Checked on 19 September 2026, and checked for currency as well as for accuracy. Every statutory provision cited on this page was traced to the current United States Code: where a provision has not been amended since the 2023 edition, that edition’s text is the current text and its amendment record was read to confirm it; where a provision was amended by Pub. L. 118–159 (23 December 2024) or Pub. L. 119–60 (18 December 2025), the current text is quoted above and the amending Act is named beside it. The two Acts’ own texts were read to establish the complete list of provisions in this chapter that they changed. This was done through the Cornell mirror of the Code and through the Acts as published by the Government Publishing Office; the House preliminary Code could not be reached from here, so no third source confirms it. No independent expert review has taken place yet, and this page says so rather than implying one.